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DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN DEALER AND INVESTOR
SALES OF REAL ESTATE
INTRODUCTION
The tax treatment accorded by the Internal Revenue Code
to capital gains or losses as contrasted with ordinary gains
or losses makes it imperative that taxpayers give timely con-
sideration to the tax consequences of the gain or loss incident
to a sale of real property. The determination of this contro-
versy is dependent upon whether the res sold was a capital
asset as defined in the Internal Revenue Code. There, capital
assets are broadly defined as "property held by the taxpayer
(whether or not connected with his trade or business)" with
a number of important exclusions.' Herein we are concerned
with one of these exclusions which has proved a fertile source
of litigation, and which provides that an asset is not a capi-
tal asset if it is "property held by the taxpayer primarily for
sale to customers in the ordinary course of his trade or
business.
' 2
The purpose of this statutory exclusion is to afford treat-
ment as ordinary income to the gain or loss on sales of real
estate held by a "dealer" for sale to customers, or a treatment
parallel to that accorded the stock-in-trade of a merchant. On
the other hand an "investor", who would usually hold real
property for the income which it produces or for long term
appreciation in value, is accorded such restricted tax effects
as are appropriate to capital gains or losses.
. TAX CONSEQUENCES OF CAPITAL GAINS AND LOSSES
The most significant aspect of the treatment of long-term
capital gains8 in the case of a taxpayer other than a corpora-
tion is the fact that only 50 per cent 4 of the recognized gain
or loss5 is taken into account in computing taxable net in-
come. Further, the law embodies an alternative tax computa-
tion which, by limiting the tax rate to 50 per cent of any ex-
cess of net long-term capital gain over net short-term capital
1. I. R. C. § 117 (a) (1).
2. I. R. C. § 117 (a) (1) (A).
3. Defined in I. R. C. § 117 (a) (4) as meaning "gain from the sale
or exchange of a capital asset held for more than six months."
4. I. R. C. § 117 (b).
5. i. R. C. § 112.
1
Fitzgerald: Distinguishing Between Dealer and Investor Sales of Real Estate
Published by Scholar Commons, 1951
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW QUARTERLY
loss results in a maximum total effective income tax rate of
25 per cent of such excess.6
While a corporate taxpayer is required to take the entire
amount of a capital gain into account regardless of the hold-
ing period,7 it is favored with an alternative tax provision
limiting the rate on long-term capital gains to 25 per cent.8
A similar principle embodying a restricted or lesser tax
effect is accorded to losses resulting from the sale of capital
assets. Corporations are allowed no deduction against ordi-
nary income for capital losses in excess of capital gains.9 rn
the case of taxpayers other than corporations net capital
losses allowed for a single year are limited to the amount of
ordinary income or $1,000.00, whichever is the lesser.10 Tax-
payers other than corporations are also favored with a five
year capital loss carry-over provision."
These statutory provisions, by placing a premium on incon-
sistency, encourage recurrent litigation- concerning essentially
similar sales transactions. It is clear that it is generally prof-
itable to a taxpayer to assert a dealer status when he has suf-
fered losses, so that they may be deducted in full as ordinary
losses, and on the other hand, to assert an investor status
when he has realized gains in order to enjoy favorable capital
gains provisions. Conversely the interest of the Government
requires the assertion of opposite contentions.
A critical appraisal of the relevant statutory language re-
veals that only indefinite and broad indicia as to the distinc-
tion between dealer and investor sales are there embodied.
This issue has been productive of much litigation because the
question presented is essentially one of fact, and no one fac-
tor or element in the cases has appeared to be invariably de-
cisive. However, the facts in the numerous decisions tend to
fall in a logical pattern. The most-important criteria which
the courts have established and reiterated are:
(1) Occupation of the Seller
(2) Extent of Sales and Developmental Activity
(3) Frequency and Continuity of Transactions
(4) Motive or Purpose
6. 1. R. C. § 117 (e) (2).
7. I. R. C. § 117 (b).
8. I. R. C. § 117 (c) (1).
9. I. R. C. § 117 (d) (1).
10.1. R. C. § 117 (d) (2).
11. I. R. C. § 117 (e).
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OCCUPATION OF THE SELLER
The frequency with which the occupation of the seller is
mentioned in the cases makes it a factor to be considered
even though no case has been decided in reliance on this point
exclusively.
From the outset it must be noted that a taxpayer may be
considered a dealer in real estate even if that is not his only
or principal business.12 Although it is not necessary that he
devote a great deal of time to this activity,13 or that the busi-
ness be extensive,14 carrying on a "business" has been held
to imply an occupational undertaking to which one habitually
devotes time, attention, or effort with substantial regularity. 5
The taxpayer who wishes to be characterized as an "inves-
tor" in respect to his dealings in realty should avoid the use
of any term connoting a real estate business. The style in
which he holds himself out to the public in advertisements,
letterheads, and telephone listings, as well as holding mem-
bership in dealers' associations' 6 may be considered signifi-
cant. The Government, as evidence that the taxpayer is a
real estate dealer, sometimes offers a statement in the tax re-
turn to that effect.'7 Indeed, the Tax Court in holding profits
taxable as ordinary income has characterized the "admission"
on the tax return as the "highest and best evidence" that the
taxpayer was a dealer, saying that surely an astute business
man with a legal education "knew in what business his firm
was engaged." 17a
Lawyers who have been involved in real estate transactions
have generally been rather successful in persuading the court
12. G. C. M 8787, C. B. 1930-2, p. 189; Oliver v. Comm'r., 138 F.
(2d) 910 (C. C. A. 4, 1943); George J. Wibbelsman, 12 T. C. 1022
(1949).
13. Ethel S. White, 6 T. C. M. 1038 (1947), affirmed 172 F. 2d
629 (C. C. A. 5, 1949).
14. Amelie M. Staff, 3 T. C. M. 1149 (1944).
15. Fahs v. Crawford, 161 F. 2d 315 (C. C. A. 5, 1947).
16. Replogle v. United States, 33 AFTR 1664 (D. C. T. S. D. Fla.,
1944); Snell v. Comm'r., 97 F. 2d 891 (C. C. A. 5, 1938); but cf.
Gruver v. Comm'r., 142 F. (2d) 368, 367 (C. C. A. 4, 1944), where the
finding that taxpayer had never had a real estate broker or agent's
license, did not advertise, and had never.been a member of any organi-
zation of real estate men was without avail, the court nevertheless char-
acterizing him a dealer.
17. Oliver v. Comm'r., 138 F. (2d) 910 (C. C. A. 4, 1943); S. E.
Boozer, 6 T. C. M. 1021, 1027 (1947).
17a. Ethel S. White, 6 T. C. M. 1038 (1947), affirmed 172 F. (2d)
629 (C. C. A. 5, 1949).
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that they were not dealers. 18 There have been decisions both
ways in respect to contractors.19 Two licensed real estate
salesmen, employed full time by a real estate firm, success-
fully contended they were investors and entitled to capital
gains treatment.20 It appears that a taxpayer may actually be
deemed an investor as to some transactions in real estate
and at the same time a dealer as to others, provided he estab-
lishes and maintains adequate accounting classifications.21
EXTENT OF SALES AND DEVELOPMENTAL ACTIVITY
It is in regard to the nature and amount of sales and devel-
opmental effort that the taxpayer can do most to assure him-
self of the desired tax treatment. Although this factor ap-
pears not to have been mentioned as often in the cases as
frequency and continuity, a consideration of it is usually nec-
essary to reconcile the cases, and has not infrequently been
persuasive in the courts' decisions.
Obviously the more active the taxpayer is in erecting "for
sale" signs, listing with real estate agents, advertising, fly-
ing flags, establishing tract offices, sub-dividing and making
improvements, the greater is the likelihood that he will be
labeled a dealer.22 It seems that real property may be fairly
extensively improved by one contending for an investor status
only if the work takes the form of "preliminary activity" cal-
culated to make the property more readily saleable.23
18. Fahs v. Crawford, 161 F. 2d 315 (C. C. A. 5, 1947); Sparks
v. United States, 55 F. Supp. 941 (D. C. Ga., 1944); Boomhower v.
United States, 74 F. Supp. 997 (D. C. Iowa, 1947); Peter A. Miller, 20
B. T. A. 230 (1930); Estate of Douglas S. Mackall, Sr., 3 T. C. M. 701
(1944).
19. Ben L. Carroll, 21 B. T. A. 724 (1930); Marsch v. Comm'r., 110
F. (2d) 423 (C. C. A. 7, 1940).
20. Ashton C. Jones, 1 T. C. M. 816 (1943).
21. Nelson A. Farry, 13 T. C., 8 (1949), following the doctrines
set out in Van Tuyl, 12 T. C., 900 (1949).
(A) 1949-20-13191, and Carl Marks & Co., 12 T. C., 1196 (1949),
allowing securities dealers to hold securities for investment purposes,
even though of the same type as others held for resale, provided they
were sufficiently segregated and separate books were kept.
22. Oliver v. Comm'r. 138 F. (2d) 910 (C. C. A. 4, 1943) ; Ehrman v.
Comm'r., 120 F. (2d) 607, 610 (C. C. A. 9, 1941); Replogle v. United
States, 33 AFTR 1664 (D. C. S. D. Fla., 1944).
23. Fahs v. Crawford, 161 F. 2d 315 (C. C. A. 5, 1947); Phipps
v. Comm'r., 54 F. (2d) 469 (C. C. A. 2, 1931) ; Sparks v. United States,
55 F. Supp. 941 (D. C. Ga. 1944); Boomhower v. United States, 74
F. Supp. 997 (D. C. Iowa, 1947) wherein taxpayer subdivided his tracts,
installed untilities, advertised for thirty-five weeks in the local paper,
but was nevertheless held not to have lost his status as an investor.
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Conversely if taxpayer largely or entirely refrains from
such active conduct and passively allows himself to be sought
out by prospective buyers, there is a distinct likelihood that
he will be held to be an investor.24 In one case wherein the
facts indicated that the sales in question were essentially in
the nature of a gradual and passive liquidation without "ex-
tensive development" and "sales activity" the Tax Court
said ". . . Nor did petitioner engage in any activities whatso-
ever to promote sales. He did no advertising, hired no agents,
did not list the property, and erected no signs. Petitioner, in
our opinion, merely accepted satisfactory offers from un-
solicited purchasers. It would seem that petitioner could have
maintained a more passive role only by refusing to sell at
all., 25
Ordinarily it is implied that one's own attention and effort
are involved, but here as elsewhere the maxim qui facit per
alium facit per se applies, and one may carry on a business
through agents whom he supervises, 26 by a developer who is an
independent contractor,27 or by a trust created by the owner.28
FREQUENCY AND CONTINUITY
In considering the frequency and continuity of transactions
the courts have often held profits to be capital gains despite
a substantial volume and frequency of sales. 29 When these de-
cisions are contrasted with those upholding a dealer status o
it appears clear that this criterion is not alone determinative
but can be intelligently evaluated only in view of the other
facts in the case.
24. Three States Lumber Co. v. Comm'r., 158 F. (2d) 61 (C. C. A.
7, 1946); Dagmar Gruy, 8 T. C. M. 787 (1949); Ethel M. Hauk....T. C.
M.-, Docket No. 23931 (T. C. Memo. Sept. 28, 1951).
25. Frieda E. J. Farley, 7 T. C. 198 (1946).
26. Brown v. Comm'r., 143 F. (2d) 468 (C. C. A. 5, 1944); Snell v.
Comm'r., 97 F. (2d) 891 (C. C. A. 5, 1938) ; John E. Sadler, 3 T. C. M.
1285 (1944).
27. Comm'r. v. Boeing, 106 F. 2d 305 (C. C. A. 9, 1939); but cf,
Fahs v. Crawford, 161 F. 2d 315 (C. C. A. 5, 1947).
28. Richards v. Comm'r., 81 F. (2d) 369 (C. C. A. 9, 1936); Welch
v. Solomon, 99 F. (2d) 41 (C. C. A. 9, 1938).
29. In Fahs v. Crawford, 161 F. 2d 315 (C. C. A. 5, 1947), 36 lots
plus 95% of the lots in the remaining large acreage were sold in 1940-
41; in Sparks v. United States, 55 F. Supp. 941 (D. C. Ga., 1944),
151h lots were sold in 1940 and 13 in 1941; in Guthrie v. Jones, 72 F.
Supp. 784 (D. C. Okla, 1947), 100 transactions in 1940-41, 24 in 1942,
and 53 in 1943; in Boomhower v. United States, 74 F. Supp. 997 (D. C.
Iowa, 1947), 7 lots in 1941 and 1 in 1943.
30. In Oliver v. Comm'r., 138 F. (2d) 910 (C. C. A. 4, 1943), 24 lots
were sold in 1938, 16 lots in 1939, and 40 lots in 1940, or in all 80 lots
5
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It has been held3' where taxpayer acquired property pre-
viously subdivided -by the -vendor, assumed further improve-
ment obligations of the vendor, made continual sales of lots
and thereafter continually added land to the project, that such
sustained operations constitute a business for tax purposes.
In reaching this result, consideration of the circumstances of
acquisition or purpose of sale were swept aside.
Conversely the cases indicate the rule that lack of contin-
uity in sales of land, either by inactivity toward the land it-
self or by infrequency of sales will give the transactions which
do take place the color of "isolated conveyances", and take
the taxpayer out of the character of one transferring title to
real estate in the "ordinary course of business.
'3 2
The courts may look to taxpayer's sales in years other than
those in question, insofar as they relate to the frequency and
continuity of sales of realty,33 and where taxpayer has ac-
quired a dealer status in earlier years, he is not deprived of
it by a later cut in volume due to a depression or business
slump.34 The court's review of frequency and volume of trans-
actions is not limited to the specific type of property sold in
the taxable year,35 but must be confined to a review of sales
and not extended to rentals of real property.
36
MOTIVE OR PURPOSE
The Board of Tax Appeals has indicated that the question
of whether property is a capital asset is dependent upon tax-
payer's "purpose or intention in its acquisition and during
his term of ownership. This is to be ascertained from his testi-
from a 175 acre tract; in White v. Comm'r., 172 F. (2d) 629 (C. C. A.
5, 1949), sales of over 250 lots were made in 1942, 87 in 1943 and 3 in
1944; in Ehrman v. Comm'r., 120 F. 2d 607 (C. C. A. 9, 1941), 120
lots were sold in 1934 and 186 lots sold in 1935; in Brown v. Comm'r.,
143 F. (2d) 468 (C. C. A. 5, 1944), 32 lots were sold in 1937, 29 in
1938 and 19 in 1939.
31. Ehrman v. Comm'r., 120 F. (2d) 607 (C. C. A. 9, 1941).
32. Goldberg v. Comm'r., 36 F. (2d) 551 (1929); Accord: Atkins v.
United States, 14 F. Supp. 288, 83 Ct. Cl. 56 (1936); 512 W. Fifty-
Sixth St. Corp. v. Comm'r., 151 F. (2d) 942 (C. C. A. 2, 1945).
33. Phipps v. Comm'r., 54 F. (2d) 469 (C. C. A. 2, 1931); Ehrman
v. Comm'r., 120 F. 2d 607, 610 (C. C. A. 9, 1941); Eddy D. Field, 8
T. C. M. 170 (1949), affirmed per curriam, 180 F. (2d) 170 (C. C. A.
9, 1950).
34. Walter G. Morley, 8 T. C. 904, 916 (1947); Replogle v. United
States, 33 AFTR 1664 (D. Ct. S. D. Fla., 1944).
35 Charles H. Black, Sr., 45 B. T. A. 204 (1941), where the sale
was of a business building, though taxpayer usually dealt in residential
property.
36. Wineman Realty Co., 1 T. C. M. 791 (1943).
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mony as to such intention, the circumstances surrounding the
acquisition, use and disposal of the property, the nature of
his business, and the character of the property." 37 It appears
clear that if a taxpayer may be shown to have obtained real
property with the intention of making prompt sales at a profit
he will be held to be a dealer,38 though a vague hope of ul-
timately realizing a profit will not serve to divorce him from
his otherwise deserved status as an investor.
39
Status as an investor has been granted in cases wherein the
mode of acquisition was involuntary, as where real property
was received upon liquidation of a corporation, 40 on the fore-
closure of a mortgage,41 or in payment of trade obligations.
42
However, such capital gain or loss treatment has been denied
in some cases of involuntary acquisition by inheritance, 43 re-
ceipt as compensation for services, 4 to protect an existing
business, 45 and in payment of a debt. 6 The Tax Court quite
properly rejected the contention advanced in one case that an
acquisition was involuntary, where taxpayers asserted they
were forced to take the parcels in question in order to get
another tract they desired.
47
Consideration of the factors and circumstances of acquisi-
tion must naturally be modified where it is made to appear
that there has been a deviation from the original purpose,'
48
37. Ben L. Carroll, 21 B. T. A. 724, 727 (1939) (A); Accord: W. D.
Haden, 2 T. C. M. 1029 (1943).
38. Gruver v. Comm'r., 142 F. (2d) 363 (C. C. A. 4, 1944); Collin v.
United States, 57 F. Supp. 217 (N. D. Ohio, 1944); Factoria Land
Company, 6 T. C. M. 234 (1947). See: George J. Wibbelsman, 12 T. C.
1022 (1949), where the court relied on language of a syndicate agree-
ment to carry this theory to an extreme otherwise difficult to justify.
39. Harriss v. Comm'r., 143 F. (2d) 279 (C. C. A. 2, 1944); Phipps
v. Comm'r., 54 F. 2d 469, 471 (C. C. A. 2, 1931); Albert F. Keeney,
17 B. T. A. 560 (1929).
40. Estate of Douglas S. Mackall, Sr., 3 T. C. M. 701 (1944).
41. Guthrie v. Jones, 72 F. Supp. 784 (D. C. Okla., 1947); Kanawha
Valley Bank, 4 T. C. 252 (1944) (A); but see White v. Comm'r., 172
F. (2d) 629 (C. C. A. 5, 1949), where a paving contractor had a dealer
status realizing ordinary income on the sale of lots from property ac-
quired by foreclosure of paving liens.
42. Thompson Lumber Co., 43 B. T. A. 726 (1941); Thompson Yards,
Inc., 1 T. C. I. 822 (1943).
43. Ehrman v. Comm'r., 120 F. 2d 607, 610 (C. C. A. 9, 1941); see
also Comm'r. v. Boeing, 106 F. (2d) 305, 309, 310 (C. C. A. 9, 1939).
44. William Foster, 2 T. C. M. 595 (1943).
45. J. 0. Chapman, 3 T. C. M. 604 (1944).
46. Alex-Weil, 3 T.C. M. 528 (1944).
47. George J. Wibbelsman, 12 T. C. 1022 (1949).
48. Richards v. Cominr., 81 F. (2d) 369 where a farmer who origi-
nally acquired property for raising produce subsequently subdivided
into lots, installed utilities, and solicited purchasers. See also Brown
7
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as the decisive question is the purpose for which the property
was held when sold.49 In one such case, unimproved real estate
was purchased with the intention of erecting a business build-
ing, but upon later abandonment of the plan the building was
sold. The property was held "used in the trade or business" and
the loss was not a capital loss, hence, was deductible in full.50
But in a somewhat similar case in which taxpayer was pre-
vented by a belatedly discovered zoning restriction from fur-
thering his intention of using the property for an automobile
paint shop, his contention of a business purpose in acquiring
the property was without avail. The court in denying this
claim stated that timely investigation would have revealed
this restriction and pointed to the fact that the property had
never been devoted to an actual business use.51
At times the courts have given weight to the motive or pur-
pose which prompted the taxpayer to make the sales in ques-
tion.52 Although in the absence of active sales effort the Tax
Court 3 and some circuits54 have given credence to an avowed
purpose in disposing of realty to liquidate the investment, this
oft repeated argument has generally been rejected by the
courts. 55 The Government contention that a sale ipso facto,
shows a dealer status has been brushed aside almost as fre-
quently as advanced.56
v. Comm'r., 148 F. 2d 468 (C. C. A. 5, 1944); cf. Frieda E. J. Farley,
7 T. C. 198 (1946) (A); but see George J. Wibbelsman, 12 T. C. 1022
(1949).
49. Oliver v. Comm'r., 138 F. (2d) 910 (C. C. A. 4, 1943), where
taxpayer, who subdivided and sold off his home place formerly operated
as a dairy, was held a dealer.
50. Carter-Colton Cigar Co., 9 T. C. 219 (1947).
51. Montell Davis, 11 T. C. 538 (1948) (A).
52. See Estate of Douglas S. Mackall, Sr., 3 T. C. M. 701 (1944),
where taxpayer was sick during the period in question, undergoing three
major operations involving amputation of his legs, and he was success-
ful in contending that the motive or purpose in selling real estate was
to liquidate the holdings to obtain needed cash, and was held to have
realized capital gains.
53. Frieda E. J. Farley, 7 T. C. 198 (1946) (A).
54. Three States Lumber Co. v. Comm'r., 158 F. (2d) 61, 64 (C. C. A.
7, 1946); Phipps v. Comm'r., 54 F. (2d) 469 (C. C. A. 2, 1931); and
See: White v. Comm'r., 172 F. (2d) 629 (C. C. A. 5, 1949), where this
view is given sympathetic treatment on principle.
55. Marsch v. Comm'r., 110 F. (2d) 423 (C. C. A. 7, 1940); Ehrman
v. Comm'r., 120 F. (2d) 607 (C. C. A. 9, 1941); Spanish Trail Land
Co., 10 T. C. 430, 435 (1948).
56. Phipps v. Comm'r., 54 F. (2d) 469 (C. C. A. 2, 1981); Ashton C.
Jones, Jr., 1 T. C. M. 816 (1943); Guthrie v. Jones, 72 F. Supp. 784
(D. C. Okla., 1947).
316
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CONCLUSION
Although the proposition has been expounded that complete
passivity is the only reliable means of avoiding treatment of
gains from the sale of realty as ordinary income, the congeries
of litigated cases indicate that there is at least some hope of
carrying on even a substantial number of sales and still being
classified as an investor.
It is unlikely that one will maintain his desired status as
an investor if his activities exceed these bounds:
(1) Make every effort to avoid the appearance of being a
real estate dealer.
(2) Avoid participation in sales and promotional endeavors.
(3) Abstain from subdividing and making improvements un-
less absolutely necessary, and then only if they may be
characterized as "preliminary activity."
(4) Endeavor to give transactions the color of "isolated con-
veyances."
(5)- In the event of the necessity for numerous sales, seek to
relate with a legitimate business need for liquidation,
and do not make reacquisitions forthwith.
(6) Hold the property for a long period to avoid the appear-
ance of purchasing for prompt sale at a profit.
It is imperative that these limits be viewed at best as un-
reliable. As indicated at the outset, the distinction between
dealer and investor sales presents an issue which is essentially
one of fact and no one criterion or indicium is invariably de-
cisive.
T. C. FITZGERALD, JR.
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